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You configure an ArubaOS-Switch to enforce 802.1X authentication with ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) denned as the RADIUS server Clients cannot authenticate You check Aruba ClearPass Access Tracker and cannot find a record of the authentication attempt.
What are two possible problems that have this symptom? (Select two)
If clients cannot authenticate and there is no record of the authentication attempt in Aruba ClearPass Access Tracker, two possible problems that could cause this symptom are:
The RADIUS shared secret does not match between the switch and CPPM. This mismatch would prevent the switch and CPPM from successfully communicating, so authentication attempts would fail, and no record would appear in Access Tracker.
CPPM does not have a network device profile defined for the switch's IP address. Without a network device profile, CPPM would not recognize authentication attempts coming from the switch and would not process them, resulting in no logs in Access Tracker.
The other options are incorrect because:
Users logging in with the wrong credentials would still generate an attempt record in Access Tracker.
Clients configured to use a mismatched EAP method would also generate an attempt record in Access Tracker.
Clients not configured to trust the root CA certificate for CPPM's RADIUS/EAP certificate might fail authentication, but the attempt would still be logged in Access Tracker.
Your Aruba Mobility Master-based solution has detected a suspected rogue AP. Among other information, the ArubaOS Detected Radios page lists this information for the AP:
SSID = PublicWiFi
BSSID = a8:bd:27:12:34:56
Match method = Plus one
Match method = Eth-Wired-Mac-Table
The security team asks you to explain why this AP is classified as a rogue. What should you explain?
The Match method 'Eth-Wired-Mac-Table' suggests that the BSSID of the rogue AP has been found in the Ethernet (wired) MAC address table of the network infrastructure. This means the AP is physically connected to the LAN. If the BSSID does not match the company's authorized APs, it implies the AP is unauthorized and hence classified as a rogue.
Refer to the exhibit.
How can you use the thumbprint?
The thumbprint (also known as a fingerprint) of a certificate or SSH key is a hash that uniquely represents the public key contained within. When you first connect to the switch with SSH from a management station, you should ensure that the thumbprint matches what you expect. This is a security measure to confirm the identity of the device you are connecting to and to ensure that a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack is not occurring. If the thumbprint matches the known good thumbprint of the switch, it is safe to proceed with the connection.
:
SSH and network security protocols that discuss the importance of verifying the identity of devices before initiating a secure connection.
IT security guides that provide best practices for avoiding MITM attacks during SSH sessions.
A company has AOS-CX switches deployed in a two-tier topology that uses OSPF routing at the core.
You need to prevent ARP poisoning attacks. To meet this need, what is one technology that you could apply to user VLANs on access layer switches? (Select two.)
The scenario involves AOS-CX switches in a two-tier topology (access and core layers) using OSPF routing at the core. The goal is to prevent ARP poisoning attacks on user VLANs at the access layer switches, where end-user devices connect. ARP poisoning (also known as ARP spoofing) is an attack where a malicious device sends fake ARP messages to associate its MAC address with the IP address of another device (e.g., the default gateway), allowing the attacker to intercept traffic.
ARP Inspection (Dynamic ARP Inspection, DAI): This feature prevents ARP poisoning by validating ARP packets against a trusted database of IP-to-MAC bindings. On AOS-CX switches, ARP inspection uses the DHCP snooping binding table to verify that ARP messages come from legitimate devices. If an ARP packet does not match the binding table, it is dropped.
DHCPv4 Snooping: This feature protects against rogue DHCP servers and builds a binding table of legitimate IP-to-MAC mappings by snooping DHCP traffic. The binding table is used by ARP inspection to validate ARP packets. DHCP snooping must be enabled before ARP inspection can function effectively, as it provides the trusted data for validation.
Option A, 'ARP inspection,' is correct. ARP inspection (DAI) directly prevents ARP poisoning by ensuring that ARP packets are legitimate, making it a key technology for this purpose.
Option B, 'OSPF passive interface,' is incorrect. OSPF passive interface is used to prevent OSPF from sending routing updates on specific interfaces, typically to reduce routing protocol traffic on user-facing interfaces. It does not prevent ARP poisoning, which is a Layer 2 attack.
Option C, 'BPDU guard (protection),' is incorrect. BPDU guard protects against spanning tree protocol (STP) attacks by disabling a port if it receives BPDUs (e.g., from an unauthorized switch). It does not address ARP poisoning, which is unrelated to STP.
Option D, 'DHCPv4 snooping,' is correct. DHCP snooping is a prerequisite for ARP inspection, as it builds the binding table used to validate ARP packets. It also protects against rogue DHCP servers, which can indirectly contribute to ARP poisoning by assigning incorrect IP addresses.
Option E, 'BPDU filtering,' is incorrect. BPDU filtering prevents a port from sending or receiving BPDUs, which can be used to protect against STP attacks, but it does not prevent ARP poisoning.
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide states:
'To prevent ARP poisoning attacks on user VLANs, enable Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) on access layer switches. DAI validates ARP packets against the DHCP snooping binding table to ensure they come from legitimate devices. Use the command ip arp inspection vlan <vlan-list> to enable DAI on the specified VLANs. DHCP snooping must be enabled first with dhcp-snooping and dhcp-snooping vlan <vlan-list> to build the binding table used by DAI.' (Page 145, ARP Inspection and DHCP Snooping Section)
Additionally, the guide notes:
'DHCP snooping and ARP inspection work together to protect against Layer 2 attacks like ARP poisoning. DHCP snooping builds a trusted database of IP-to-MAC bindings, which ARP inspection uses to filter out malicious ARP packets.' (Page 146, Best Practices Section)
:
HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide, ARP Inspection and DHCP Snooping Section, Page 145.
HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide, Best Practices Section, Page 146.
Refer to the exhibit.
An admin has created a WLAN that uses the settings shown in the exhibits (and has not otherwise adjusted the settings in the AAA profile) A client connects to the WLAN Under which circumstances will a client receive the default role assignment?
In the context of an Aruba Mobility Controller (MC) configuration, a client will receive the default role assignment if they have passed 802.1X authentication and the authentication server did not send an Aruba-User-Role Vendor Specific Attribute (VSA). The default role is assigned by the MC when a client successfully authenticates but the authentication server provides no specific role instruction. This behavior ensures that a client is not left without any role assignment, which could potentially lead to a lack of network access or access control. This default role assignment mechanism is part of Aruba's role-based access control, as documented in the ArubaOS user guide and best practices.
