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Services A, B, and C reside in Service Inventory A and Services D, E, and F reside in Service Inventory B .Service B is an authentication broker that issues WS-Trust based SAML tokens to Services A and C upon receiving security credentials from Services A and C .Service E is an authentication broker that issues WS-Trust based SAML tokens to Services D and F upon receiving security credentials from Services D and E .Service B uses the Service Inventory A identify store to validate the security credentials of Services A and C .Service E uses the Service Inventory B identity store to validate the security credentials of Services D and F .To date, the two service inventories have existed independently from each other. However, a requirement has emerged that the services in Service Inventory A need to be able to use the services in Service Inventory B, and vice versa. How can cross-service inventory message exchanges be enabled with minimal changes to the existing service inventory architectures and without introducing new security mechanisms?

Service Consumer A sends a request message to Service A (1) after which Service A retrieves financial data from Database A (2). Service A then sends a request message with the retrieved data to Service B (3). Service B exchanges messages with Service C (4) and Service D (5), which perform a series of calculations on the data and return the results to Service A .Service A uses these results to update Database A (7) and finally sends a response message to Service Consumer A (8). Component B has direct, independent access to Database A and is fully trusted by Database A .Both Component B and Database A reside within Organization A .Service Consumer A and Services A, B, C, and D are external to the organizational boundary of Organization A .

Component B is considered a mission critical program that requires guaranteed access to and fast response from Database A .Service A was recently the victim of a denial of service attack, which resulted in Database A becoming unavailable for extended periods of time (which further compromised Component B). Additionally, Services B, C, and D have repeatedly been victims of malicious intermediary attacks, which have further destabilized the performance of Service A .How can this architecture be improved to prevent these attacks?
Service A provides a data access capability that can be used by a variety of service consumers. The database records accessed by Service A are classified as either private or public. There are two types of service consumers that use Service A:
Service consumers with public access permissions (allowed to access only public data records) and service consumers with private access permissions (allowed to access all data records). For performance reasons the Service A architecture uses a single database, named Database A .Each record in Database A is classified as either private or public. After Service A is invoked by a service consumer (1), it authenticates the request message using an identity store and retrieves the corresponding authorization (2, 3). Once authorized, the service consumer's request is submitted to Database A (4), which then returns the requested data (5) If the service consumer has private access permissions, all of the returned data is included in Service A's response message (6). If the service consumer has public access permissions, then Service A first filters the data in order to remove all unauthorized private data records before sending to the response message to the service consumer (6). In addition to retrieving data, Service A's data access capability can be used to update database records. An investigation recently revealed an information leakage problem that can occur when service consumers with public access permissions attempt to update the ID value of a database record The ID values of all database records (private or public) must be unique. When a service consumer with public access permissions updates a public database record with an ID value that is already assigned to a private database record, the database returns an error message describing this conflict. This error text reveals confidential information by stating that the ID value submitted by the service consumer with public access permissions already exists within a private database record. What steps can be taken to avoid this problem while preserving the requirement that all database records (private and public) have unique ID values?

Service A has two specific service consumers, Service Consumer A and Service Consumer B (1). Both service consumers are required to provide security credentials in order for Service A to perform authentication using an identity store (2). If a service consumer's request message is successfully authenticated, Service A processes the request by exchanging messages with Service B (3) and then Service C (4). With each of these message exchanges, Service A collects data necessary to perform a query against historical data stored in a proprietary legacy system. Service A's request to the legacy system must be authenticated (5). The legacy system only provides access control using a single account. If the request from Service A is permitted, it will be able to access all of the data stored in the legacy system. If the request is not permitted, none of the data stored in the legacy system can be accessed. Upon successfully retrieving the requested data (6), Service A generates a response message that is sent back to either Service Consumer A or B .The legacy system is also used independently by Service D without requiring any authentication. Furthermore, the legacy system has no auditing feature and therefore cannot record when data access from Service A or Service D occurs. If the legacy system encounters an error when processing a request, it generates descriptive error codes. This service composition architecture needs to be upgraded in order to fulfill the following new security requirements:
1. Service Consumers A and B have different access permissions and therefore, data received from the legacy system must be filtered prior to issuing a response message to one of these two service consumers.
2. Service Consumer A's request messages must be digitally signed, whereas request messages from Service Consumer B do not need to be digitally signed. Which of the following statements describes a solution that fulfills these requirements?

Service A provides a customized report generating capability. Due to infrastructure limitations, the number of service consumers permitted to access Service A concurrently is strictly controlled. Service A validates request messages based on the supplied credentials (1). If the authentication of the request message is successful, Service A sends a message to Service B (2) to retrieve the required data from Database A (3). Service A stores the response from Service B (4) in memory and then issues a request message to Service C (5). Service C retrieves a different set of data from Database A (6) and sends the result back to Service A (7). Service A consolidates the data received from Services B and C and sends the generated report in the response message to the service consumer (8). It has been discovered that attackers have been gaining access to confidential data exchanged between Service A and Service B, and between Service A and its service consumers. What changes can be made to this service composition architecture in order to counter this threat?
